Epistemological foundationalism can be generally characterized as the thesis that in order for there to be any genuine knowledge at all, there must be some self-authenticating instances of knowledge which epistemically ground the whole edifice. This position can be seen to involve three distinct claims: there are self-authenticating, noninferential pieces of knowledge; these privileged instances can be infallibly recognized as such so as to be able to function in grounding other knowledge claims; and without some such instances functioning in this (...) way, knowledge would have no foundation and skepticism would ensue. Although adherents of this ideal run the gamut from Aristotle to Husserl, it is usually identified with the epistemological problematic introduced by Descartes and Locke. The particular formulations of this general ideal differ to the extent that the self-authenticating instances are recognized as being sense-data, phenomenological essences, or intellectual principles. (shrink)

In this age when idealistic themes such as contextualistic theories of meaning and coherence theories of truth are again becoming commonplace in epistemology and philosophy of science, it should be profitable to recall some of the great representatives of the idealistic tradition in order to reexamine their views on the issues of epistemology and their interpretations of science. The purpose of this paper is to examine, if only partially, idealistic views on this latter issue, i.e., on the nature of science.

In this paper I would like to explore Sellars' answers to these general epistemological questions in order to get clear about the sense in which he can be said to be in the empiricist tradition broadly construed and to ascertain what resources he has available to demarcate science from other (rationally acceptable or unacceptable) forms of inquiry. My contention will be that to the degree that one moves away from the notion of basic empirical proposition in the strong sense it (...) becomes increasingly difficult to draw the distinction between empiricism and other general epistemological traditions and increasingly difficult to distinguish science frow other forms of inquiry. Moreover, this latter difficulty tends to render vacuous the claims of scientific realism. (shrink)

This paper takes up again the perennial issue of the foundations of empirical knowledge. the general issue is seen to have three distinct though interrelated facets: those of "meaning", "justification", and "truth". first, how is it that our statements about the world acquire meaning; secondly, how is it that our beliefs about the world are justified; and thirdly, in what precisely consists the truth or falsity of the propositional content of our beliefs? answers to these questions are invariably interdependent, and (...) both classically and on the contemporary scene "the foundationalist" and "the coherentist" pictures of knowledge have been the dominant alternatives. after discussing each of these clear though stark views in some detail, i endeavor to construct and defend what i characterize as a mitigated foundational account of knowledge. (shrink)

Wilfrid Sellars was one of the most creative, systematic, and underappreciated Anglo-American philosophers of this century. His academic career carried him from Iowa to Minnesota, to Yale, and finally to Pittsburgh, spawning many devoted students who became distinguished philosophers in their own right. Sellar's philosophical orientation was pervasively systematic and historical when these features were unfashionable, and his style proved to be impenetrable to the uninitiated. As a result his thought was not accorded the prominence it merited. It flourished for (...) the most part only in the philosophizing of his students. (shrink)